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Showing posts with label Public policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Public policy. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 16, 2025

Canada’s Silent Subsidy: Tax-Deductible Donations, Israeli Settlements, and Military Support

 

Why Canadian tax policy, not foreign policy, may be shaping outcomes in the West Bank

Illustration showing the Canada Revenue Agency as a source of tax-deductible funds flowing through intermediaries toward Israeli settlement activity and military presence in the West Bank, highlighting the concept of proxy financing.
How tax-deductible donations can function as indirect financial support for settlement and military activity in the West Bank.

By J. Andre Faust (Dec 16, 2025)

Abstract

This article examines recent findings by CBC’s The Fifth Estate concerning Canadian charities that issue tax receipts for donations ultimately supporting Israeli settlement activity and military-affiliated organisations in the occupied West Bank. Rather than presenting original investigative reporting, the article treats the Fifth Estate investigation as a catalyst for structural analysis. It situates the Canadian case within a broader international context, comparing how similar charitable and tax-advantaged systems operate in the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, and selected European states. The analysis argues that the issue is not unique to Canada, nor reducible to ideology, but reflects a recurring governance failure in which charitable law, foreign policy, and enforcement mechanisms drift out of alignment. Written under The Connected Mind banner, this first article focuses on identifying the problem. Subsequent pieces will apply a Unified Theory of Probabilistic Connections and game-theory analysis to explain why such outcomes persist.

The Catalyst: What The Fifth Estate Documented

In October 2025, CBC’s The Fifth Estate aired an investigation into Canadian registered charities that issue tax receipts for donations directed toward Israeli organisations operating in or supporting settlements in the occupied West Bank. Drawing on Canada Revenue Agency filings, access-to-information documents, sanctions lists, and controlled test donations, the investigation identified millions of dollars in tax-deductible Canadian donations flowing through charitable intermediaries to settlement-linked and military-affiliated entities.

The reporting highlighted a structural contradiction. Canada’s official foreign policy recognises Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal under international law and has imposed sanctions on individuals and entities associated with extremist settler violence. At the same time, Canadian tax law prohibits registered charities from acting as conduits for foreign entities, funding foreign armed forces, or operating in ways contrary to public policy. Yet the investigation documented cases in which Canadian charities appeared to facilitate precisely such outcomes.

Importantly, The Fifth Estate did not allege criminal guilt. Instead, it demonstrated how existing regulatory frameworks are applied unevenly, often reactively, and frequently only after public or media scrutiny. The investigation therefore serves not as an endpoint, but as a starting point for a broader structural question: is this a uniquely Canadian failure, or part of a wider international pattern?

Charitable Status and Structural Risk

Charitable tax receipts are not neutral instruments. They convert private donations into public subsidies by reducing government revenue. In effect, the state becomes an indirect participant in whatever activity the donation supports. For this reason, Canadian charity law places strict requirements on direction and control over foreign expenditures and explicitly prohibits support for foreign militaries or activities that undermine Canadian public policy.

When a charity issues a tax receipt for funds that ultimately support settlement expansion or military-affiliated organisations, the legal issue is not donor intent. It is functional outcome. Even absent malicious intent, the charity acts as an intermediary that enables financial flows Canadians could not lawfully make directly. From a regulatory perspective, this intermediary role is precisely what the conduit prohibition is designed to prevent.

This is where the concept of proxy behaviour becomes analytically relevant. A proxy, in this context, does not imply coordination or conspiracy. It describes a structural role in which an organisation enables, legitimises, or shields activities that would otherwise face legal or policy barriers.

Is Canada Unique? A Comparative Perspective

United States

The United States represents the most permissive model. Under the 501(c)(3) framework, US charities may legally fund Israeli military support organisations and settlement-linked activities, often framed as welfare or educational assistance. This permissiveness reflects US foreign policy, which does not formally classify settlements as illegal in the same way as Canada or the European Union. The contradiction in the US system is political rather than regulatory.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom’s Charity Commission operates under a framework closer to Canada’s. UK foreign policy recognises settlements as illegal, and charities are required to demonstrate public benefit and compliance with international law. Several UK charities have faced investigations, warnings, or trustee suspensions for activities linked to occupied territories. Enforcement, however, remains largely complaint-driven and reactive.

European Union

At the European Union level, settlements are unequivocally considered illegal under international law, and EU public funding is barred from supporting settlement activity. Private charitable enforcement varies by member state. While some national regulators apply strict oversight, others rely on disclosures and post-hoc investigations, allowing similar structural gaps to persist.

Australia

Australia closely mirrors Canada. Official policy opposes settlement expansion, and charities are prohibited from funding foreign military activity. Nonetheless, enforcement by the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission has been limited, with scrutiny typically arising only after public controversy.

France and Germany

France and Germany apply comparatively strict preventative controls. Charity registration, banking oversight, and foreign-transfer scrutiny are tightly integrated, reducing the likelihood that settlement-linked funding flows persist unnoticed. As a result, fewer cases reach the stage of public scandal, not because demand is absent, but because enforcement occurs earlier.

What the Comparisons Reveal

Across jurisdictions, a consistent pattern emerges. Where foreign policy positions, charitable law, and enforcement mechanisms diverge, charitable systems become low-visibility transmission channels for geopolitical finance. Tax incentives amplify these effects, while fragmented oversight diffuses accountability.

Canada’s case is notable not because it is unique, but because the contradiction is unusually stark. Settlements are deemed illegal, specific entities are sanctioned, and charitable law explicitly forbids conduit behaviour. Yet enforcement remains slow, reactive, and politically cautious. The result is a system in which outcomes persist that no single institution openly endorses.

Policy Silence, Reactive Enforcement, and the Structural Gap

Despite the seriousness of the issues raised by The Fifth Estate investigation, there has been no broad public policy statement indicating that Canada intends to reform its charitable tax framework in response. Federal authorities have not announced legislative amendments, revised CRA guidance, or articulated a coherent enforcement strategy that explicitly addresses charitable funding linked to settlement activity or foreign military-affiliated organisations.

Official responses have instead emphasised that Canada already has “stringent laws” governing charities. While this is formally true, it sidesteps the central problem identified by the investigation: the issue is not the absence of rules, but the absence of systematic alignment between charitable law, foreign policy, and enforcement practice.

To date, enforcement appears case-by-case and reactive, rather than preventive or risk-based. Charitable status revocations and compliance actions have largely followed media investigations, public complaints, or legal challenges. There is little evidence of proactive audits focused on foreign-policy risk, geographic exposure, or sanctions overlap. Nor has there been any indication that charities operating in high-risk geopolitical contexts are subject to enhanced scrutiny before violations occur.

This complaint-driven model effectively outsources detection to journalists and civil society organisations. It allows questionable practices to persist until they become publicly visible, rather than preventing them through regulatory design. The result is not regulatory failure in a narrow sense, but regulatory lag: institutions applying rules designed for an earlier era to a far more complex and politicised financial environment.

Why Proxy Behaviour Emerges Without Intent

This enforcement gap helps explain why certain charities can come to function as de facto financial proxies, even in the absence of explicit coordination or malicious intent.

Charitable tax receipts transform private donations into public subsidies by reducing government revenue. When such receipts are issued for funds that ultimately support settlement expansion or military-affiliated entities, the state becomes an indirect financial participant in activities that contradict its stated foreign policy. From a structural standpoint, this outcome does not require bad faith. It requires only three conditions:

  1. Tax incentives that amplify private donations
  2. Weak or delayed enforcement of direction-and-control rules
  3. A lack of policy integration between tax administration and foreign affairs

Where these conditions coexist, charities can unintentionally assume a proxy role, enabling financial flows that individuals could not lawfully make on their own.

This is precisely what The Fifth Estate investigation documented. The issue is not that charities openly defy Canadian law, but that no mechanism exists to prevent misalignment before it occurs.

A Connected Mind Framing

The Connected Mind is the branding and intellectual framework under which this analysis is presented. It begins from the philosophical assumption that complex social, legal, and institutional systems are interconnected, and that outcomes should be examined structurally rather than in isolation.

From this perspective, the issue raised by The Fifth Estate is not best understood as a collection of individual compliance failures. It is better understood as an emergent property of an interconnected system in which tax policy, charitable law, regulatory caution, and geopolitical sensitivity interact in unintended ways.

This article’s purpose is identification. It establishes how a system designed to encourage charitable giving can, under certain conditions, produce outcomes that contradict stated national commitments.

Looking Ahead: UTPC and Game-Theory Analysis

Subsequent articles under The Connected Mind banner will move beyond identification. One will apply a Unified Theory of Probabilistic Connections to explain mechanistically how such institutional entanglements arise and persist. Another will apply game-theory analysis to examine how rational actors respond to incentives within this system, even when the collective outcome is undesirable.

For now, the essential point is this: outcomes that appear intentional can emerge from systems that are merely misaligned. Recognising that misalignment is the first step toward addressing it.

References

ACNC. (2023). Australian charity compliance and foreign activities. Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission.

Bundesministerium der Finanzen. (2023). Non-profit law and international financial oversight. Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany.

Canada Revenue Agency. (2024). Guidance on charities and foreign activities. Government of Canada.

CBC News. (2025a). Canadian charities complicit in helping fund Israeli settlement movement in West Bank, critics say. The Fifth Estate.

CBC News. (2025b). Investigating charities getting tax breaks for funding Palestinian displacement. The Fifth Estate.

Charity Commission for England and Wales. (2023). Charities and overseas activities: Compliance guidance.

European Commission. (2022). EU policy on settlements and funding eligibility.

Internal Revenue Service. (2023). Exempt organizations and international activities. United States Department of the Treasury.


About the author

J. André Faust writes under The Connected Mind, focusing on the structural entanglements of politics, economics, and society. His work uses a layered-systems approach to trace feedback, map incentives, and revise beliefs as new information emerges.

Wednesday, November 19, 2025

How Canada Shifted From Nation Building to Corporate Welfare

How Canada Shifted From Nation Building to Corporate Welfare

by J. Andre Faust (Nov 19, 2025)

Canada has offered incentives to businesses since the nineteenth century, but the meaning and purpose of those incentives have changed over time. Early support for industry was tied to national development, such as railway construction and western expansion (Norrie, Owram, & Emery, 2008). In the modern era the logic shifted as corporations became international and gained the power to relocate production. This mobility allowed them to pressure governments for tax breaks, grants, and subsidies, a pattern widely documented in political economy research (Helleiner, 2006).


Early Canada: Tariffs and Land Grants (1867 to early 1900s)

In the first decades after Confederation, business incentives were focused on building the country. The National Policy of 1879 introduced high protective tariffs to support Canadian manufacturing (Creighton, 1956). Railway companies received land grants, low interest loans, and other support because transportation infrastructure was essential for national unity and settlement (Berton, 1970).

These early incentives were not tax breaks in the modern sense. Businesses could not threaten to relocate internationally. Canada’s economy was territorially anchored, and incentives were tools for nation building rather than corporate negotiation.

The First Modern Incentives (1930s to 1950s)

The Great Depression, the Second World War, and post-war reconstruction brought the first recognisable business incentives. Capital cost allowances, implemented in the 1940s, permitted companies to deduct machinery depreciation from taxable income (Perry, 1955). Wartime industrial expansion required grants and procurement contracts, which later transformed into peacetime industrial support (Granatstein, 1990).

By the 1950s the federal government also began regional development initiatives to address economic disparities among provinces (Savoie, 1992). Canadian corporations still lacked international mobility, and incentives did not arise from relocation threats.

The Global Shift: Mobility and Leverage (1960s to 1980s)

During the 1960s and 1970s, economic globalisation accelerated. Multinational corporations expanded internationally, production chains spread across borders, and trade policies liberalised. This period marked a major turning point in the bargaining power of corporations (Levitt, 1983).

Canada responded with targeted incentives, including investment tax credits, research and development subsidies such as the Scientific Research and Experimental Development credit, and regional industrial development grants (Dobbin, 1994). These measures were no longer about building the country. They were designed to keep corporations from leaving.

The Contemporary Period: Competing for Global Corporations (1990s to Present)

By the 1990s the mobility of global capital had reached full maturity. Trade agreements such as NAFTA, along with WTO rules, allowed firms to reorganise production on a continental or global basis (Clarkson, 2002). Corporations gained significant leverage by threatening to move production to jurisdictions with lower taxes or better subsidies.

Canada responded by lowering federal corporate tax rates and offering increasingly targeted incentives for automotive plants, aerospace manufacturing, technology firms, natural resource developers, and film and digital media industries (Standing Committee on Finance, 2009). Provincial governments often competed with one another to attract or retain major employers.

This dynamic mirrors global trends where governments provide incentives not solely for economic development but to prevent corporations from relocating to other countries. Researchers describe this pattern as a race to the bottom in corporate taxation and industrial subsidies (Swank, 2006).


Conclusion: How Mobility Shifted Power to Corporations

The history of Canadian business incentives reveals a clear pattern. In the nineteenth century grants and support programmes were aimed at building national infrastructure. In the twentieth century they promoted industrial growth and regional equality. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the meaning shifted. Once corporations gained the ability to operate globally, they also gained leverage. Today incentives are often responses to this mobility. Governments compete for investment while corporations can choose where to locate production.

This change represents a structural shift in the relationship between governments and global capital. It explains how public money began to finance what critics call corporate welfare, and how national economic policy became shaped by international corporate strategies.


References

Berton, P. (1970). The National Dream. McClelland and Stewart.
Clarkson, S. (2002). Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State. University of Toronto Press.
Creighton, D. (1956). The Road to Confederation. Macmillan of Canada.
Dobbin, F. (1994). Forging Industrial Policy. Cambridge University Press.
Granatstein, J. L. (1990). Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939–1945. University of Toronto Press.
Helleiner, E. (2006). Towards North American Monetary Union? McGill-Queen's University Press.
Levitt, T. (1983). The globalization of markets. Harvard Business Review, 61(3), 92–102.
Norrie, K., Owram, D., & Emery, J. C. H. (2008). A History of the Canadian Economy. Thomson-Nelson.
Perry, J. (1955). Canadian tax policy and capital cost allowances. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 21(4), 449–462.
Savoie, D. (1992). Regional Economic Development: Canada's Search for Solutions. University of Toronto Press.
Standing Committee on Finance. (2009). Tax Incentives for Industry. Parliament of Canada.
Swank, D. (2006). Tax policy in an era of globalization. International Organization, 60(4), 847–880.


About the Author

J. André Faust explores the structural entanglements of politics, economics, and society through a layered systems perspective. His work follows the principle that understanding emerges when we trace connections, map feedback, and revise beliefs as new information appears. The Connected Mind examines how local events are linked to global networks that shape behaviour and outcomes.