GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF THE SMOOT-HAWLEY TARIFF ACT

 By J André Faust  (Jan 19, 2025)

Below is a game theory analysis of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (Tariff Act of 1930) and its repercussions. While this historical event predates the formalization of many game-theoretic concepts, we can nonetheless interpret the behaviour of the United States and its trading partners in strategic, game-theoretic terms.

President Trump informed Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, following their meeting at his Mar-a-Lago resort, that he plans to move forward with a 25% tariff on Canadian goods. This statement implies he is not bluffing. Examining the situation through the lens of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, game theory suggests that other nations (or “players”) would likely respond in a similar manner. While this does not necessarily mean we would be plunged into another depression, it suggests we might see outcomes reminiscent of those experienced during the Smoot-Hawley era.

While history does not repeat itself exactly, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act offers a cautionary tale. If Trump continues his tit-for-tat tariff strategy, it could have serious economic consequences similar to those of the trade war of the 1930s, which served as the catalyst for the Great Depression. The key question now is whether international actors will de-escalate or whether this will spiral into a modern trade war with long-term consequences.

1. Setting the Stage: Players and Strategies

Players:

• The United States, aiming to protect domestic industries and farmers.

• Major U.S. trading partners (e.g., Canada, France), seeking continued access to U.S. markets and to safeguard their own industries.

Strategies:

1. Impose High Tariffs (Protectionist): Unilaterally raise or maintain high import duties to shield domestic producers from foreign competition.

2. Maintain or Lower Tariffs (Cooperative): Keep tariffs low or reduce them to foster international trade, despite short-term pressure from domestic industries.

In the Smoot-Hawley context, the United States chose Protectionist (raising tariffs), while its trading partners could respond by either accepting the tariffs or retaliating with tariffs of their own.

2. Game Structure: A Multi-Player “Trade War” Scenario

Game theory often models trade interactions as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma:

• Short-Term Gain: If one player imposes high tariffs while others do not retaliate, that player can enjoy short-term benefits (domestic industry protection, potential political support).
• Retaliation Risk: However, if the other players also impose high tariffs, overall trade suffers—everyone is worse off.

When the U.S. raised tariffs drastically under Smoot-Hawley, it essentially made a unilateral “defection” move. This spurred other nations to retaliate with their own tariffs, dragging all parties into a non-cooperative equilibrium where trade volumes declined significantly.

3. Payoffs and Outcomes

• U.S. Short-Term Payoff: Protection for certain domestic industries and a political narrative of “protecting jobs.”
• U.S. Long-Term Payoff: Retaliatory tariffs severely reduced exports, contributing to a deeper economic downturn. Industries relying on international sales were particularly harmed.
• Trading Partners’ Payoff: They faced higher barriers to exporting goods to the U.S. Imposing retaliatory tariffs helped them politically at home but shrank global trade overall.
• Collective Outcome: The strategy profile where everyone imposes high tariffs is Pareto-inferior. No single country benefits enough to offset the overall loss in global trade, contributing to worsening conditions during the Great Depression.

4. Retaliation and Repeated Games

In a single-shot game, one might gain by imposing high tariffs while others keep them low. However, global trade is typically a repeated game, with ongoing interactions over time. Retaliation (tit-for-tat) is common:

• Tit-for-Tat: After Smoot-Hawley, countries like Canada immediately raised tariffs on U.S. goods, mirroring U.S. action.
• Persistent Non-Cooperation: Once both sides enacted protectionist stances, reversing course required significant policy shifts (which did not occur until the mid-1930s with reciprocal trade agreements).

5. Information and Expectations

Over 1,000 economists opposed Smoot-Hawley, indicating a strong belief it would backfire. In game theory terms, this reflects:

• Incomplete Information: U.S. policymakers underestimated other nations’ willingness to retaliate.
• Overoptimistic Beliefs: Officials presumed other countries might not retaliate or that domestic gains would outweigh any global drawbacks.

6. Lessons Through a Game Theoretic Lens

• Mutual Gains Through Cooperation: International trade is often more beneficial if nations lower tariffs collectively.
• Danger of Defection: One nation’s decision to raise tariffs can trigger a chain reaction, leading to a “trade war” that hurts all players.
• Importance of Repeated Interactions: Over time, trust and stable agreements (like GATT and the WTO) serve to prevent destructive cycles of retaliatory tariffs.

From a game theory perspective, Smoot-Hawley exemplifies how short-term political gains can lead to non-cooperative equilibria with long-term collective losses.

Conclusion

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act represents a classic case of defection in an iterated trade game. By dramatically raising tariffs, the U.S. encouraged other nations to do the same, resulting in economic isolation and a deeper global crisis. The severe consequences of this non-cooperative strategy helped pave the way for more cooperative, rules-based global trade policies in the decades that followed, which may be how the Trump game will end.

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