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Showing posts with label Ottoman Empire. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ottoman Empire. Show all posts

Sunday, October 26, 2025

Palestine: The Second Intifada – The Uprising That Divided a Nation

By J. André Faust (Oct 26, 2025)

The Second Intifada – The Uprising That Divided a Nation

The Second Intifada (Arabic: al-Intifāḍa al-Thāniya), which erupted in late September 2000, was a major Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that lasted roughly until 2005. It marked the collapse of the optimism born from the Oslo Accords and a return to large-scale violence after years of stalled diplomacy (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014; BBC, 2010).

1. From the First Intifada to Oslo

The First Intifada (1987–1993) was a largely grass-roots movement driven by daily hardship under occupation. It combined strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations to challenge Israeli control (Khalidi, 2007). The resulting Oslo Accords were intended to establish Palestinian self-rule within five years and move toward a two-state solution. However, continued settlement expansion, economic restrictions, and growing cynicism within both societies eroded the process long before it reached fruition (Lustick, 2006).

2. The Road to the Second Intifada

By 1999, peace talks had stalled. Many Palestinians perceived Oslo as perpetuating dependency rather than ending occupation. Critics saw the Palestinian Authority as weak and corrupt, while many Israelis viewed continued violence as proof that concessions were futile. The immediate spark came on 28 September 2000, when Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the al-Aqsa Mosque compound (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem—a site sacred to Muslims and Jews. The visit was widely seen as a provocation, igniting protests that spread across the territories (AP, 2000).

3. From Protest to Warfare

Unlike the civil resistance of the first uprising, the Second Intifada quickly became militarised. Armed factions—including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—launched bombings and shooting attacks inside Israel. Israel responded with targeted assassinations, large-scale incursions into West Bank cities (notably Operation Defensive Shield), and the construction of the separation barrier (Human Rights Watch, 2002). By 2005, roughly 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis had been killed (B’Tselem, 2006).

4. Continuity and Divergence

AspectFirst Intifada (1987–1993)Second Intifada (2000–2005)
NatureCivil resistance, boycottsArmed uprising, suicide bombings
LeadershipGrass-roots / PLO coordinationFatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad factions
TriggerAccumulated hardshipSharon visit + Oslo collapse
OutcomeOslo Accords, creation of PARe-entry of IDF into West Bank; Fatah–Hamas division

The Second Intifada was thus an eruption of unfulfilled expectations from the first. Where Oslo had promised transformation, Palestinians witnessed deeper control and fragmentation—culminating in the political split that endures between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.

5. The Oslo Framework: A Fragile Architecture

Between 1993 and 2000, a sequence of agreements known as the Oslo framework attempted to transform the conflict into a phased peace process. Each accord advanced the idea of Palestinian self-rule, yet none resolved the core disputes of sovereignty, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem. The structure looked solid on paper but remained fragile in practice—a temporary architecture suspended between hope and hostility.

Oslo I: Declaration of Principles (1993)

Signed at the White House on 13 September 1993, Oslo I established mutual recognition—Israel acknowledged the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO recognised Israel’s right to exist—and set a five-year transition toward final-status talks, with limited Palestinian self-government in Gaza and parts of the West Bank (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014).

Oslo II: The Taba Agreement (1995)

Signed on 28 September 1995, Oslo II expanded autonomy and divided the West Bank into Areas A (full PA control), B (PA civil control with Israeli security), and C (full Israeli control—about 60% of the West Bank). It also provided for Palestinian elections and security coordination. The division created a patchwork geography that complicated movement and governance; Rabin’s assassination weeks later further eroded trust.

Later Attempts to Salvage Oslo

  • Hebron Protocol (1997): Partitioned Hebron into Israeli- and Palestinian-administered sectors.
  • Wye River Memorandum (1998): Called for further redeployments and security steps; implementation stalled.
  • Camp David Summit (2000): A final-status push on borders, refugees, and Jerusalem collapsed; weeks later, the Second Intifada began.

Each agreement produced a brief moment of coherence in a system under strain.

6. The Oslo Accords: A Promise Deferred

The accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA) and recognised mutual legitimacy (Rabinovich, 2017), but left the most critical issues—Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders—for later. Israel retained full control over Area C and movement between Palestinian zones. By the late 1990s, settlement growth and frequent closures convinced many Palestinians that Oslo had repackaged occupation rather than ended it. Within Israel, politics polarised; Rabin’s 1995 assassination signalled the domestic cost of compromise.

7. Marwan Barghouti: The Imprisoned Symbol of Unity

Marwan Barghouti emerged during the First Intifada as a Fatah organiser and later a leading member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Advocating a two-state solution while defending a right to resist occupation, he sought to bridge diplomacy and defiance (Milton-Edwards, 2008). During the Second Intifada, Israel accused him of directing the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Captured in 2002 and convicted in 2004 for involvement in attacks that killed five Israelis, he received five life sentences. He refused to recognise the court’s authority, turning the trial into a political statement.

From prison, Barghouti became a rallying figure, often compared to Nelson Mandela. Polls consistently rank him the most popular potential successor to Mahmoud Abbas. His name resurfaced in 2025 when the U.S. signalled that Israel might be pressed to consider his release as part of post-Hamas reconstruction efforts (Associated Press, 2025).

8. The 4D Perspective: Cycles of Entanglement and Collapse

Within the 4D dynamic connectivity model, the two Intifadas appear as successive phase transitions in a single historical field. Each cycle builds pressure, releases energy, and re-entangles actors in new configurations of conflict and control.

Phase One (1967–1987): Compression of Energy

Post-1967 occupation created a high-pressure field—intense social energy constrained by external dominance. The First Intifada was the spontaneous discharge of that pressure through largely non-violent means.

Phase Two (1993–2000): Oscillation and Interference

The Oslo Accords generated overlapping expectations: peace versus sovereignty. These waveforms interfered destructively as settlement expansion and checkpoints eroded trust, setting conditions for the next collapse.

Phase Three (2000–2005): Resonance Collapse

The Second Intifada represented the decoherence of Oslo’s waveform: both sides locked in violent resonance until the system lost coherence, bifurcating into Fatah’s West Bank and Hamas’s Gaza.

9. Present Layer: Toward a New Equilibrium

Current discussion surrounding Marwan Barghouti’s potential release illustrates another attempt at re-stabilising the field (Associated Press, 2025). From a systems view:

  • Barghouti embodies latent legitimacy—an unmeasured particle capable of re-cohering Palestinian politics.
  • Hamas’s decline dissipates one energy mode, allowing reconfiguration.
  • The two-state framework remains the lowest-entropy equilibrium, achievable only if political vectors align toward coexistence rather than control.

10. Closing Thought: The Field Remembers

Suppressed energy does not vanish; it accumulates. The First Intifada converted despair into diplomacy. The Second turned disillusionment into division. The next phase will test whether the system can transform trauma into coherence: a stable alignment of justice, security, and recognition.


References

Associated Press. (2000). Timeline: Ariel Sharon visit to al-Aqsa Mosque and subsequent clashes.
Associated Press. (2025, October 23). Trump mulls asking Israel to free Palestinian leader Barghouti.
BBC News. (2010). Q&A: Second Intifada.
Beinin, J., & Hajjar, L. (2014). Palestine, Israel and the Arab–Israeli Conflict. Middle East Research and Information Project.
B’Tselem. (2006). Fatalities in the Second Intifada.
Human Rights Watch. (2002). Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Unlawful Killings and Collective Punishment.
Khalidi, R. (2007). The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Beacon Press.
Lustick, I. (2006). Trapped in the War on Terror. University of Pennsylvania Press.
Milton-Edwards, B. (2008). Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement. Polity Press.
Rabinovich, I. (2017). Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier, Leader, Statesman. Yale University Press.


About the Author

J. André Faust is a systems thinker and analyst whose work explores the structural entanglements of politics, economics, and society. Through The Connected Mind, he examines how historical patterns and feedback loops shape the present and constrain the future. His current research develops a 4D Dynamic Connectivity Model — a framework for tracing interactions across time, scale, and ideology to reveal where stability or collapse may emerge next.

Wednesday, October 22, 2025

From Ottoman Collapse to Modern Chaos: The Hidden Links Behind Today’s Conflicts

From Ottoman Collapse to Modern Chaos — a visual timeline showing the decline of the Ottoman Empire dissolving into colonial partitions and modern conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. The design moves from fading imperial banners to new national borders and silhouettes symbolising modern instability.

Figure 1. From Ottoman Collapse to Modern Chaos — visual representation of historical fragmentation and modern entanglements.

From the Fall of Empires to the Fracture of Order

How the Ottoman Collapse Still Shapes Today’s Conflicts — and the New Probabilities Ahead

by J. André Faust (October 22, 2025)

Abstract

This essay applies a 4D probabilistic lens to show how the collapse of the Ottoman Empire produced a branching field of geopolitical possibilities whose aftershocks shape the Israel–Palestine crisis and parallel dynamics in Russia–Ukraine. Each historical moment contained multiple potential outcomes that were unknowable to actors within their timeframe. The essay argues that modern double standards and external interventions are not anomalies but structural continuities. Finally, it considers Donald Trump’s re-entry into high-stakes decision-making as a new uncertainty variable that alters the current probability landscape; the realised outcome will only be known after the fact.

When the Ottoman Empire fell in 1918, it released not only provinces but possibilities. Empires do not simply collapse; they disintegrate into probability fields where competing futures coexist until one is realised. In Palestine, imperial pluralism gave way to nationalist partition and occupation; identities hardened, and external powers redrew the map according to their interests (Cleveland & Bunton, 2024; UNGA, 1947; Yale Law School, 1916, 1917).

1) The Ottoman Root

Under the Ottoman millet system, Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived within an unequal but plural legal framework. When that umbrella vanished after the First World War, Britain and France filled the vacuum. The Sykes–Picot Agreement divided Ottoman lands into spheres, and the Balfour Declaration supported a Jewish national home while promising not to prejudice the rights of existing non-Jewish communities (Yale Law School, 1916, 1917).

2) From Mandate to Partition to Occupation

The British Mandate preserved aspects of Ottoman administration but inverted the political logic, catalysing Arab and Jewish national movements. The United Nations later endorsed partition in Resolution 181, accelerating a path toward war and long-term displacement (UNGA, 1947; Cleveland & Bunton, 2024). Ottoman land records still recur in disputes, a reminder that empire’s paperwork remains active evidence in the present.

3) The Parallel Case: Russia’s Imperial Successor

The 1991 dissolution of the USSR echoed Ottoman dynamics: multi-ethnic empire, ambiguous borders, minorities outside new states. NATO enlargement recast the security field and sharpened Russian threat perceptions, producing a frontier of chronic insecurity (NATO, 2024). As with Palestine, historical claims and contemporary security narratives collide with international law and power politics (International Criminal Court, 2023).

4) History as a Multiverse of Probabilities

Each junction — Sykes–Picot, Balfour, Partition, post-1967 policy — offered multiple possible futures. From within those moments, outcomes were uncertain. Decisions narrowed the field without eliminating uncertainty, much like observation collapsing a wave function. The 4D Dynamic Connectivity Model treats these as branching probability clouds that repeatedly collapse into realised sequences (Cleveland & Bunton, 2024).

5) Double Standards and External Power

Russia is sanctioned and isolated after annexations in Ukraine, while Israel’s occupation is condemned in principle but protected in practice by key allies. The asymmetry shows up in legal venues as well: the ICC issued arrest warrants in both situations (International Criminal Court, 2023; International Criminal Court, 2024), and the World Court has now advised that Israel must allow UN aid into Gaza and ensure basic needs are met (Reuters, 2025). The pattern reflects alliance structures more than neutral principle.

6) The Trump Variable: A New Uncertainty Node

Donald Trump’s re-entry adds a high-variance node to an already entangled system. Policy towards Israel–Palestine, NATO, and international courts may shift rapidly. Recent US measures targeting ICC officials show how great-power politics can re-weight legal processes and incentives across the field (U.S. Department of State, 2025). In probabilistic terms, this is a disturbance to the wave: multiple plausible futures coexist, and the actual outcome will only be known after observation resolves uncertainty.

7) The Living Wave of History

From Ottoman collapse to Soviet dissolution, from Partition to NATO enlargement, each decision re-entangles the global system. We do not predict a single future; we map probability flows. The Israel–Palestine and Russia–Ukraine crises are not anomalies. They are the latest collapses in a century-long superposition of outcomes. Until we address the structural inheritance of empire, we will keep reliving aftershocks rather than resolving the quake.

8) Conclusion

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and later of the Soviet Union, demonstrates that history behaves less like a line and more like a multidimensional field of probabilities. Each empire held diversity in suspension; its fall released competing forces that re-entangled the world in new configurations of power and identity. The resulting crises—from Gaza to Donbas—are not separate events but linked outcomes in a shared systemic chain.

Understanding this through the 4D Dynamic Connectivity Model helps us see that prediction is impossible in the strict sense: every decision, policy, or intervention is an observation that alters the field itself. Donald Trump’s renewed engagement in Middle Eastern and global policy represents the next observation point, one that could collapse the wave toward renewed conflict or an unexpected equilibrium. Only hindsight will reveal which branch of history we will inhabit.


References

  1. Cleveland, W. L., & Bunton, M. (2024). A history of the modern Middle East (7th ed.). Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/A-History-of-the-Modern-Middle-East/Cleveland-Bunton/p/book/9780367516468
  2. International Criminal Court. (2023, March 17). Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and
  3. International Criminal Court. (2024, November 21). Situation in the State of Palestine: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges
  4. NATO. (2024, October 3). Topic: Enlargement and Article 10. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm
  5. Reuters. (2025, October 22). World Court says Israel must allow U.N. aid to Gaza and ensure basic needs of Palestinians are met. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/world-court-give-opinion-israels-obligations-allow-aid-palestinians-2025-10-22/
  6. U.S. Department of State. (2025, August 20). Imposing further sanctions in response to the ICC’s ongoing threat to Americans and Israelis. https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/08/imposing-further-sanctions-in-response-to-the-iccs-ongoing-threat-to-americans-and-israelis
  7. United Nations General Assembly. (1947, November 29). Resolution 181 (II): Future government of Palestine. Security Council Report archive PDF. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A%20RES%20181%20%28II%29.pdf
  8. Yale Law School. (1916). The Sykes–Picot Agreement. The Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp
  9. Yale Law School. (1917). The Balfour Declaration. The Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp

About the author

J. André Faust writes The Connected Mind, an inquiry into the structural entanglements of politics, economics, and society. The guiding idea is simple: trace feedback, weigh probabilities, and revise beliefs in light of new evidence.