The Illusion of a Ceasefire: Reframing Control Through Managed Conflict

The Illusion of Peace

by J. André Faust (October 29, 2025)

1. The ceasefire that never was

Officials continue to describe events as a ceasefire, yet air strikes, raids and retaliations have persisted. Recent coverage by BBC News notes fresh Israeli strikes and competing claims of violations (BBC News, 29 Oct 2025). The Toronto Star / Associated Press characterises the truce as fragile, brokered by the United States, and repeatedly tested by flare-ups (Toronto Star / AP, 29 Oct 2025).

2. Language as control

Framing shapes reality for audiences. JD Vance stated that the ceasefire is holding, while allowing for “little skirmishes,” which reframes ongoing violence as incidental (BBC live coverage, 29 Oct 2025). Turkey’s foreign ministry condemned Israeli strikes as open violations of the agreement, demonstrating how identical events are cast in opposite moral terms (Turkey MFA statement, 29 Oct 2025).

3. Controlled chaos as strategy

The United States signals that Israel may strike when attacked, while insisting the broader deal must hold (Toronto Star / AP, 29 Oct 2025). This produces bounded instability, where limited violence is permitted, yet narrative control is maintained. In practice this resembles a managed-conflict model rather than peace.

4. Proxies and plausible deniability

Reports describe rival armed groups in Gaza, sometimes referred to as “Popular Forces,” operating alongside or against Hamas (BBC reporting, 29 Oct 2025). Whether directly armed, tolerated, or simply exploited, such actors create ambiguity that can justify renewed strikes and shift blame. ICRC also criticised a staged recovery of remains as unacceptable, underscoring the information fog that aids deniability (ICRC statement, 29 Oct 2025).

5. The United States as the stabilising illusion

Senior US officials, including the vice-president and the secretary of state, continue high-visibility visits and statements to signal oversight, even as strikes resume and pause. This projects assurance without necessarily imposing accountability (Toronto Star / AP, 29 Oct 2025). The observer’s presence alters outcomes, a political analogue of measurement in physics.

6. Phase one stasis

Coverage indicates the agreement remains stuck in its initial exchange phase, with disputes over the handling of deceased hostages, and continued allegations of violations (Toronto Star / AP, 29 Oct 2025; BBC live, 29 Oct 2025). Activity persists, yet progress stalls, which resembles dynamic stasis rather than transition.

7. The systems view: illusion as policy

In a layered-systems perspective, ceasefire and conflict lie on the same operational curve. Proxies act as disturbance nodes, language acts as a selector, and observation by powerful states functions as a stabiliser. The result is a policy of controlled uncertainty. When instability is instrumentally useful, ceasefire becomes theatre.

8. Applying the 4D Connectivity Model

Within the 4D Connectivity Model, each vertex represents a point of convergence across four dimensions—three spatial and one temporal. Every moment in time, like every position in space, contains an infinite potential field of outcomes. Each decision, observation, or reaction selects one trajectory from that field, momentarily collapsing probability into experience.

Because every vertex in both time and space can unfold into countless possibilities, absolute predictability is impossible. Systems that appear stable are merely temporary alignments within an ever-changing probability matrix. The Israel–Gaza situation illustrates this vividly: each airstrike, statement, or negotiation does not simply change the present — it reshapes the range of all possible futures that follow.

In this framework, time is not a line but a dynamic landscape of branching possibilities. What we call “control” or “peace” exists only as a transient pattern, constantly rewritten by new events and observations. The illusion of a permanent ceasefire collapses under this model, revealing a deeper reality: that every moment generates new dimensions of uncertainty.

About the author

J.  André Faust examines the structural entanglements of politics, economics and society. He explores how single moments, from a lone act of violence to a policy choice, can unfold into decades of social and cultural change.

His approach treats reality like a layered 3D model. Systems overlap, interact and sometimes obscure one another. Forecasts are provisional, hidden layers and feedback loops are often still at work.

Guiding idea: understand connections, trace feedback and revise beliefs as new layers come into view.

References & Sources

1. BBC News (29 Oct 2025). Israel strikes Gaza after accusing Hamas of ceasefire violations. Live updates.
2. Toronto Star / Associated Press (29 Oct 2025). US determined to prevent the collapse of the Gaza ceasefire after overnight airstrikes.
3. International Committee of the Red Cross (29 Oct 2025). Statement on alleged staged recovery of hostage remains.
4. Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 Oct 2025). Statement on Israeli strikes and ceasefire commitments.
5. Al Jazeera (29 Sep 2025). Full text of Trump’s 20-point plan to end the Gaza war.

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Palestine: The Second Intifada – The Uprising That Divided a Nation

By J. André Faust (Oct 26, 2025)

The Second Intifada – The Uprising That Divided a Nation

The Second Intifada (Arabic: al-Intifāḍa al-Thāniya), which erupted in late September 2000, was a major Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that lasted roughly until 2005. It marked the collapse of the optimism born from the Oslo Accords and a return to large-scale violence after years of stalled diplomacy (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014; BBC, 2010).

1. From the First Intifada to Oslo

The First Intifada (1987–1993) was a largely grass-roots movement driven by daily hardship under occupation. It combined strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations to challenge Israeli control (Khalidi, 2007). The resulting Oslo Accords were intended to establish Palestinian self-rule within five years and move toward a two-state solution. However, continued settlement expansion, economic restrictions, and growing cynicism within both societies eroded the process long before it reached fruition (Lustick, 2006).

2. The Road to the Second Intifada

By 1999, peace talks had stalled. Many Palestinians perceived Oslo as perpetuating dependency rather than ending occupation. Critics saw the Palestinian Authority as weak and corrupt, while many Israelis viewed continued violence as proof that concessions were futile. The immediate spark came on 28 September 2000, when Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the al-Aqsa Mosque compound (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem—a site sacred to Muslims and Jews. The visit was widely seen as a provocation, igniting protests that spread across the territories (AP, 2000).

3. From Protest to Warfare

Unlike the civil resistance of the first uprising, the Second Intifada quickly became militarised. Armed factions—including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—launched bombings and shooting attacks inside Israel. Israel responded with targeted assassinations, large-scale incursions into West Bank cities (notably Operation Defensive Shield), and the construction of the separation barrier (Human Rights Watch, 2002). By 2005, roughly 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis had been killed (B’Tselem, 2006).

4. Continuity and Divergence

Aspect	First Intifada (1987–1993)	Second Intifada (2000–2005)
Nature	Civil resistance, boycotts	Armed uprising, suicide bombings
Leadership	Grass-roots / PLO coordination	Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad factions
Trigger	Accumulated hardship	Sharon visit + Oslo collapse
Outcome	Oslo Accords, creation of PA	Re-entry of IDF into West Bank; Fatah–Hamas division

The Second Intifada was thus an eruption of unfulfilled expectations from the first. Where Oslo had promised transformation, Palestinians witnessed deeper control and fragmentation—culminating in the political split that endures between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.

5. The Oslo Framework: A Fragile Architecture

Between 1993 and 2000, a sequence of agreements known as the Oslo framework attempted to transform the conflict into a phased peace process. Each accord advanced the idea of Palestinian self-rule, yet none resolved the core disputes of sovereignty, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem. The structure looked solid on paper but remained fragile in practice—a temporary architecture suspended between hope and hostility.

Oslo I: Declaration of Principles (1993)

Signed at the White House on 13 September 1993, Oslo I established mutual recognition—Israel acknowledged the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO recognised Israel’s right to exist—and set a five-year transition toward final-status talks, with limited Palestinian self-government in Gaza and parts of the West Bank (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014).

Oslo II: The Taba Agreement (1995)

Signed on 28 September 1995, Oslo II expanded autonomy and divided the West Bank into Areas A (full PA control), B (PA civil control with Israeli security), and C (full Israeli control—about 60% of the West Bank). It also provided for Palestinian elections and security coordination. The division created a patchwork geography that complicated movement and governance; Rabin’s assassination weeks later further eroded trust.

Later Attempts to Salvage Oslo

• Hebron Protocol (1997): Partitioned Hebron into Israeli- and Palestinian-administered sectors.
• Wye River Memorandum (1998): Called for further redeployments and security steps; implementation stalled.
• Camp David Summit (2000): A final-status push on borders, refugees, and Jerusalem collapsed; weeks later, the Second Intifada began.

Each agreement produced a brief moment of coherence in a system under strain.

6. The Oslo Accords: A Promise Deferred

The accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA) and recognised mutual legitimacy (Rabinovich, 2017), but left the most critical issues—Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders—for later. Israel retained full control over Area C and movement between Palestinian zones. By the late 1990s, settlement growth and frequent closures convinced many Palestinians that Oslo had repackaged occupation rather than ended it. Within Israel, politics polarised; Rabin’s 1995 assassination signalled the domestic cost of compromise.

7. Marwan Barghouti: The Imprisoned Symbol of Unity

Marwan Barghouti emerged during the First Intifada as a Fatah organiser and later a leading member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Advocating a two-state solution while defending a right to resist occupation, he sought to bridge diplomacy and defiance (Milton-Edwards, 2008). During the Second Intifada, Israel accused him of directing the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Captured in 2002 and convicted in 2004 for involvement in attacks that killed five Israelis, he received five life sentences. He refused to recognise the court’s authority, turning the trial into a political statement.

From prison, Barghouti became a rallying figure, often compared to Nelson Mandela. Polls consistently rank him the most popular potential successor to Mahmoud Abbas. His name resurfaced in 2025 when the U.S. signalled that Israel might be pressed to consider his release as part of post-Hamas reconstruction efforts (Associated Press, 2025).

8. The 4D Perspective: Cycles of Entanglement and Collapse

Within the 4D dynamic connectivity model, the two Intifadas appear as successive phase transitions in a single historical field. Each cycle builds pressure, releases energy, and re-entangles actors in new configurations of conflict and control.

Phase One (1967–1987): Compression of Energy

Post-1967 occupation created a high-pressure field—intense social energy constrained by external dominance. The First Intifada was the spontaneous discharge of that pressure through largely non-violent means.

Phase Two (1993–2000): Oscillation and Interference

The Oslo Accords generated overlapping expectations: peace versus sovereignty. These waveforms interfered destructively as settlement expansion and checkpoints eroded trust, setting conditions for the next collapse.

Phase Three (2000–2005): Resonance Collapse

The Second Intifada represented the decoherence of Oslo’s waveform: both sides locked in violent resonance until the system lost coherence, bifurcating into Fatah’s West Bank and Hamas’s Gaza.

9. Present Layer: Toward a New Equilibrium

Current discussion surrounding Marwan Barghouti’s potential release illustrates another attempt at re-stabilising the field (Associated Press, 2025). From a systems view:

• Barghouti embodies latent legitimacy—an unmeasured particle capable of re-cohering Palestinian politics.
• Hamas’s decline dissipates one energy mode, allowing reconfiguration.
• The two-state framework remains the lowest-entropy equilibrium, achievable only if political vectors align toward coexistence rather than control.

10. Closing Thought: The Field Remembers

Suppressed energy does not vanish; it accumulates. The First Intifada converted despair into diplomacy. The Second turned disillusionment into division. The next phase will test whether the system can transform trauma into coherence: a stable alignment of justice, security, and recognition.

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References

Associated Press. (2000). Timeline: Ariel Sharon visit to al-Aqsa Mosque and subsequent clashes.
Associated Press. (2025, October 23). Trump mulls asking Israel to free Palestinian leader Barghouti.
BBC News. (2010). Q&A: Second Intifada.
Beinin, J., & Hajjar, L. (2014). Palestine, Israel and the Arab–Israeli Conflict. Middle East Research and Information Project.
B’Tselem. (2006). Fatalities in the Second Intifada.
Human Rights Watch. (2002). Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Unlawful Killings and Collective Punishment.
Khalidi, R. (2007). The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Beacon Press.
Lustick, I. (2006). Trapped in the War on Terror. University of Pennsylvania Press.
Milton-Edwards, B. (2008). Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement. Polity Press.
Rabinovich, I. (2017). Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier, Leader, Statesman. Yale University Press.

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About the Author

J. André Faust is a systems thinker and analyst whose work explores the structural entanglements of politics, economics, and society. Through The Connected Mind, he examines how historical patterns and feedback loops shape the present and constrain the future. His current research develops a 4D Dynamic Connectivity Model — a framework for tracing interactions across time, scale, and ideology to reveal where stability or collapse may emerge next.

Israel And The Proxy Variable: How Controlled Chaos Becomes a Weapon

The Proxy Variable: How Controlled Chaos Becomes a Weapon

by J. André Faust (October 19, 2025)

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According to BBC News (19 Oct 2025), Israel launched new air strikes in southern Gaza after accusing Hamas of violating the Trump-brokered ceasefire by firing on Israeli troops near Rafah. Hamas denied involvement, claiming that smaller armed groups — locally called the “Popular Forces” — were responsible. These gangs, said to be armed and supported by Israel, suggest that a proxy war is unfolding within Gaza’s borders.

Reuters and the Associated Press reported that the escalation followed the first phase of prisoner and hostage exchanges under President Trump’s twenty-point ceasefire plan. While Washington frames the process as “peace through strength,” the on-the-ground reality has fractured into overlapping zones of control and narrative.

Historically, Israel has used internal Palestinian divisions to weaken central authority. In the 1980s, Israeli intelligence tolerated Islamist charities that later evolved into Hamas, partly to counterbalance the secular PLO. Subsequent coordination with Fatah deepened the fragmentation. Today’s emergence of armed gangs in Gaza suggests a revival of that strategy under new conditions.

The Proxy Variable

In systems terms, a proxy is a variable deliberately introduced into the field. It injects uncertainty and redirects accountability. Within my Unified Theory of Entanglement, this becomes the Proxy Variable — a disturbance node that reshapes probabilities without appearing as a direct actor.

Each explosion, denial, or diplomatic statement alters the perception field. As PBS NewsHour noted in October 2025, efforts to end the war are constrained by “conflicting incentives” — a polite way of saying that each side operates within its own reality frame. Israelis see renewed threats; Palestinians see sabotage; Americans see justification for stabilisation. The truth collapses differently for each observer.

Inside Israel, criticism of Prime Minister Netanyahu has intensified. Nieman Reports (2025) documented his widening conflict with domestic media, while families of hostages accuse him of delays and mismanagement. The result is a perceptual inversion: Trump is being celebrated as the decisive deal-maker, while Netanyahu is cast as the obstructive partner.

In this environment, controlled chaos becomes a tool of governance. It is not the breakdown of order — it is order redesigned to remain unstable. From an entanglement perspective, the Proxy Variable allows dominant powers to manipulate instability itself, generating endless justification for intervention while obscuring the origin of violence.

About the author

J.  André Faust examines the structural entanglements of politics, economics and society. He explores how single moments, from a lone act of violence to a policy choice, can unfold into decades of social and cultural change.

His approach treats reality like a layered 3D model. Systems overlap, interact and sometimes obscure one another. Forecasts are provisional; hidden layers and feedback loops are often still at work.

Guiding idea: understand connections, trace feedback and revise beliefs as new layers come into view.

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References & Sources

1. BBC News (19 Oct 2025). Israel launches air strikes in Gaza, accusing Hamas of “blatant violation of ceasefire.”
2. Reuters (12 Oct 2025). Ceasefire holds in Gaza ahead of hostage release and Trump’s visit to Israel.
3. Associated Press (12 Oct 2025). First seven hostages freed as part of Gaza ceasefire are in Israeli custody.
4. Times of Israel (11 Oct 2025). Israel publishes list of 250 security prisoners slated for release as part of Gaza deal.
5. PBS NewsHour (Oct 2025). Why it is so hard to end the war in Gaza.
6. Nieman Reports (2025). Netanyahu vs the Israeli Media.

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